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Antoine dAutume, Katheline Schubert
Paris School of Economics, University Paris 1 PanthéonSorbonne
Cees Withagen
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
International di¤erences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justied by dif-
ferent local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by di¤erent
preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon
tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We
address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods
have to be nanced through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has
to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump-sum
transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting
good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country-specic, dealing with the
local negative externality, a second one, country-specic, dealing with the cost of
levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality
and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show
that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best frame-
work. Nevertheless, if lump-sum transfers between governments are impossible to
implement, international di¤erentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take
care of equity concerns.
keywords: carbon price, second best, Pigovian taxation
1 Introduction
The virtues of a uniform carbon price, taking the form of a world carbon tax or being
the result of a world emission permits market, are well recognized. A uniform carbon
price, reecting the true social cost of emissions, is the best incentive to curb all negative
externalities associated with fossil fuel consumption and global warming. Uniformity of
the price implies the equalization of marginal abatement costs and therefore minimizes the
worldwide cost of abatement of emissions. The redistribution of tax receipts or the initial
allocation of permits then o¤ers the possibility to accompany carbon taxation with an
international redistribution scheme and to share equitably the burden of taxation between
countries. This optimistic picture is often questioned in the name of realism.
We thank Julien Daubanes, Pierre Lasserre, Stéphane Gauthier, and especially Roger Guesnerie for
useful discussions. Antoine dAutume and Katheline Schubert acknowledge the support of the French
National Research Agency (ANR) under the CLEANER project (ANR_NT09_505778). Cees Withagen
gratefully acknowledges 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Existing di¤erences in national energy taxation, especially fuel taxation, are consid-
erable (see Table 1). The question that arises is whether we should consider such taxes
as implicit carbon taxes and therefore abstain from super-imposing a specic carbon tax.
Table 1: Excise on premium unleaded gasoline in some OECD countries, 2012 (% of
the consumer price)
Germany Denmark United States F in land France Ita ly Japan United K ingdom Sweden
39.0 33.9 13.1 37.9 37.3 40.1 38.1 40.6 36.6
Source: IEA Statistics, Energy prices and taxes, 2013
Moreover, is it really possible to use the allocation of tax receipts or emission quotas
to alter substantially the world distribution of income? First of all, a consequence of
using a quota allocation mechanism is clearly that the implied lump-sum transfers to
local governments are restricted to be positive. Second, will governments even accept to
depart from the simple rule that each country should be paid back exactly the amount
of taxes it paid or the value of the permits it had to buy? If international transfers are
so restricted, isnt it preferable to allow poor countries to face a lower carbon price?
Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) put forward such an argument against the international
equalization of abatement costs and suggested that a lower e¤ort should be required from
poor countries. Shiell (2003) followed up on this idea and in particular characterized the
set of second best optimal allocations when intercountry transfers are restricted to be
positive or to be exactly equal to the sums paid to the world regulator. Sandmo (2005)
also pointed out that the carbon price must be uniform if perfect international transfers
are possible, but should be di¤erentiated when they are not, to reect redistributive
concerns.
A proper analysis of these issues requires a clarication of the purpose of existing fuel
taxes in the rst place. If no clear economic reason may be invoked for their existence,
adding to them a uniform carbon price has no chance to appear optimal. However, if
existing taxes are, in some sense, already xed at an optimum level, adding a common
tax to curb global warming may be warranted. Existing fuel taxation has two prime
objectives. The rst one is to counter local externalities independently of global warming.
For example, burning of fossil fuel contributes to global warming through CO2 emissions,
but also leads to SO2 and particulate matters emissions, which have a local e¤ect. The
second objective of fuel taxation is that it o¤ers governments an easy way to levy funds
and nance the provision of public goods. The French gasoline tax, the so-called TICE
(Taxe Intérieure sur la Consommation dEnergie), an excise tax currently xed at 0.61
euros per liter, has indeed been created taking explicitly into account the two objectives of
reducing negative externalities associated with fuel consumption by cars and of providing
means to nance highway construction.
International di¤erences in fuel taxation may a priori be justied by di¤erent local
negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by di¤erent preferences for public
spending in the di¤erent countries. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon
tax, or emission permit price, be added to these optimal local taxes? This is the question
we consider.
Addressing seriously the nancing of public goods provision necessitates a second best
approach. Public goods have to be nanced through distortionary taxation and the cost
of these distorsions, i.e., the cost of levying public funds, has to be weighted against the
utility of public goods. On the other hand, Pigovian taxes, aiming at reducing negative
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externalities, and (distortionary) taxes, aiming at nancing the provision of public goods,
are to some extent substitutes. A Pigovian tax required to decrease emissions is also a
means to nance public spending. Inversely, a negative externality associated with the
production of a commodity decreases the cost of public funds associated with the use of
this good as a tax-base. The negative impact of the distortions associated with taxation
are mitigated by the reduction of the negative externality. Sandmo (1975) initiated this
kind of analysis in a one-country case.
In this paper, we extend the Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Sandmo (2005) models
by introducing local externalities and public goods. We consider a clean consumption
good, a dirty consumption good, source of both local externalities and global warming,
and a public good. The three goods may be produced in each country from a given
endowment of a generic good. There is no international trade and countries interact only
through global emissions. These assumptions are made mainly for the sake of a clear
presentation of the results. The main message will not be a¤ected by including more
realistic production technologies.
We rst examine rst best optimal allocations and show that they can be implemented
by a world regulator through country-specic emission taxes and lump-sum transfers to
consumers, possibly negative. The pollution tax consists of two parts, one dealing with
the local externality and another one dealing with the global externality. The latter part
is uniform across countries. This suggests a more decentralized implementation. Local
governments then levy a tax correcting the local externality, are in charge of the provision
of the local public good, and tax or subsidize their consumers in a lump-sum way. An
international environmental agency collects the uniform global pollution tax and makes
lump-sum (positive or negative) transfers to local governments, thus taking international
equity concerns into account. This implementation assumes passive local governments,
who do not take advantage of the inuence they might have on the world carbon price
and the levels of international transfers. Basically, this preliminary analysis conrms the
optimistic view which we described above. In a rst best setting, the uniformity of the
carbon tax should be the rule, provided local governmental decisions are taken in an
optimal way.
We then consider a more realistic second best framework. We follow the standard
Ramsey approach and assume that governments cannot tax consumers in a lump-sumway.
If necessary they have to rely on distortionary taxation to nance public good provision.
We show that the second best taxes on the polluting good may be decomposed into
three parts: one, country-specic, dealing with the local pollution externality, a second
one, country-specic, dealing with the marginal cost of levying public funds, and a third
one, global, dealing with the global externality. Our main contribution is to show that
uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. This is
a striking result as we know since Lipsey and Lancaster (1956-7) that rules which are
optimal in a rst best world generally fail to be so in a second best world.
To get a better understanding of this result we show that a true decentralization of
the second best optimum may be obtained. The international environmental agency xes
a common carbon tax or controls emissions through a permits market, and distributes
lump-sum transfers to local governments. Each of these is then free to deal as it wishes
with local externalities and distortionary taxation needed to nance the provision of
local public goods. This result supports, in a somewhat general setting, Tiroles (2009)
proposal to base climate policy upon a world permits market, leaving each country free
to choose whatever instrument it wants to meet its emission target. This result relies
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on the feasibility of arbitrary lump-sum transfers between countries, which takes us back
to the Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Sandmo (2005) analysis. This assumption is
debatable.
Let us rst point out that the impossibility of lump-sum taxation of consumers, which
is at the core of the Ramsey approach, cannot be readily extended to the case of countries
or local governments. In the case of consumers, this impossibility is justied by informa-
tion problems. Personalized lump-sum transfers are impossible because governments lack
the necessary information about individual characteristics. The Ramsey approach then
simply assumes away the possibility to levy a lump-sum tax on consumers, thus o¤ering a
useful short-cut to analyze a situation where distortionary taxation is required. Sandmo
(2000), among others, provides such a defense. On the contrary, the impossibility to
implement arbitrary lump-sum transfers between governments cannot be motivated by
information problems. Intercountry transfers have indeed been part of the rst Kyoto
negociations, in the form of asymmetric quotas allocations favoring developing coun-
tries, and received new support at the Cancun United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change conference in December 2010, where a Green Climate Fund has been
established to assist developing countries in the nancing of their climate policies.
Intercountry transfers thus appear a priori feasible. However, they face political
economy objections. Governments know that their citizens would probably object to
sizable transfers to other governments. The assumption of no intercountry transfers
may then appear realistic, and we also examine its consequences. As the receipts of the
world carbon tax, or the revenues of the sale of the permits, have to be redistributed,
the no intercountry transfers assumption can be rephrased as the condition that each
country should receive a positive lump-sum transfer precisely equal to the amount of
carbon taxation paid by its citizens. We examine in a last section the optimum under
this assumption, called third best optimum. We thus revert to the Chichilnisky and Heal
(1994) result. In such a framework, international di¤erentiation of the carbon price is
the only way to take care of equity concerns. Poorer countries should probably pay a
lower carbon tax. However, this result may be put in perspective. The redistributive
gains of such a di¤erentiation of carbon taxes may be small. A substantial amount of
redistribution would then be at the cost of an important loss of e¢ ciency.
We restrict our analysis to the case of local governments which are passive in the
sense that they take as given the world carbon price and the transfers they receive from
the international environmental agency. Verbon and Withagen (2010) consider on the
contrary the case of active local governments who act strategically as they understand
that their behavior a¤ects the world carbon price. In a rather general framework, they
show that a proper initial allocation of permits may counter strategic behavior and thus
lead to a Pareto e¢ cient allocation. Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) follow a di¤erent route
and show that local government decisions may, in a very special case, produce a Pareto-
e¢ cient outcome.
2 The model
We consider n countries (n  2), indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; n: There is a representative
consumer in each. Each country has an endowment Yi of a generic good. This good
may be used to produce, one for one, a private clean good, a local non-polluting public
good and a private polluting good. Pollution is both local and global and encompasses
country-specic pollution and greenhouse emissions contributing to global warming. We
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denote by Ci, Gi and Xi consumption of the three goods by the representative consumer
in each country. Pollution is denoted by Zi: The polluting good is scaled in such a way
that Zi = Xi:World pollution is denoted by Zw = Z1+Z1:::+Zn = X1+X2:::+Xn = Xw:
By X we denote the vector (X1; X2; :::; Xn): The vectors C; Y; G and Z are dened in a
similar way.
There is no international trade. Each country consumes its production of the three
goods and only interacts with others through its contribution to global warming. Inter-
national transfers of the non-polluting consumption good will be possible, however. The
production side of the model is highly simplied, all marginal costs of production being
basically equal to one, in terms of the generic good. These simplications do not a¤ect
our main results.
The utility function of the representative consumer in jurisdiction i is
U i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Zi; Zw) (1)
We assume U iC ; U
i
X ; U
i
G > 0; U
i
Z ; U
i
Zw
< 0: Here U iC is the partial derivative with respect to
Ci and the other expressions have a similar meaning. Moreover, we assume that the utility
function satises the usual conditions such as di¤erentiability, concavity in (C;X;G);
convexity in (Z;Zw) and, in maximization processes, allows for interior solutions.
3 First best
3.1 The social optimum and its implementation
A rst best Pareto optimum may be characterized as a feasible allocation which max-
imizes a weighted sum of individual utilities, since we can identify countries and their
representative consumers. Under convexity assumptions, varying the weights provides an
easy way to describe the whole set of Pareto optima. The weights may be interpreted as
the derivatives of a social utility function having individual utility levels as arguments.
Let  = (1; 2; :::; n) be the weights attached to the utilities of the representative
consumer in each country. A rst best Pareto optimum is a solution of the following
problem:
max
nX
i=1
iU
i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw) (2)
subject to the resource constraint
nX
i=1
Yi 
nX
i=1
(Ci +Xi +Gi) (3)
and non-negativity conditions. Under mild non-satiation conditions, the resource con-
straint (3) is binding at a Pareto optimum.
Proposition 1 A rst best Pareto optimum is characterized by the following conditions:
1U
1
C = ::: = iU
i
C = ::: = nU
n
C (4)
U iG
U iC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (5)
U iX
U iC
+
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (6)
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The proof of this proposition is in the appendix, as well as the proofs of all other
propositions.
The three sets of conditions (4)(6) and the resource constraint (3) jointly determine
optimal levels of production of all goods. Conditions (5) and (6) are e¢ ciency conditions
which do not depend on the social weights  attached to the various consumers. They
state that the consumersmarginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the three goods
should be equal to one, namely their relative production costs. The MRS between the
polluting good Xi and the non-polluting good Ci takes into account the negative damages
the consumption of the polluting good creates, both locally and worldwide, through global
warming. These damages are evaluated in terms of the private non-polluting good. Con-
dition (4) selects a particular Pareto optimum, depending on the social weights attached
to individual consumers by the world central planner. It shows that weighted marginal
utilities derived from clean consumption should be equalized across consumers/countries.
Let us now see how this Pareto optimum may be implemented. We assume that a
world regulator is in charge of the control of local and global externalities and of public
goods provision. Local governments play no role at this stage. Without loss of generality,
we assume that clean consumption is not taxed. The world regulator imposes pollution
taxes i (i = 1; 2; :::; n) that may di¤er accross consumers, nances all public spending
Gi and makes direct positive or negative transfers Tci to consumers.
Budget constraints of the consumers and the world regulator are respectively:
Ci + (1 + i)Xi = Yi + Tci; i = 1; 2; :::; n (7)
nX
i=1
iXi =
nX
i=1
(Gi + Tci) (8)
The representative consumer of country i maximizes utility under the budget con-
straint (7), taking public spending Gi and pollution levels Zi and Zw as given. The
optimality condition is:
U iX
U iC
= 1 + i; i = 1; 2; :::; n (9)
Comparison with (6) shows that optimality requires tax rates equal to:
i =  U
i
Z
U iC
 
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
; i = 1; 2; :::; n (10)
with quantities taken at the optimum. The additivity property in this formula suggests
to decompose each tax rate into a local component, equal to the local marginal damage,
and a common global one, equal to the sum of all worldwide marginal damages resulting
from global warming:
i = i +  ; i =  
U iZ
U iC
;  =  
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
(11)
With these Pigovian taxes, condition (9) states that the price of the polluting good, for
the consumer, is equal to its true marginal cost, including its own marginal production
cost, equal to one, and marginal environmental costs. Optimality also requires proper
levels of provision of public goods, according to condition (5). Finally, lump-sum transfers
Tci are used to reach a specic Pareto optimum, characterized by the weights is attached
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to each country. These transfers may be positive or negative. In the case where rst best
Pigovian tax receipts are su¢ cient to nance all rst best public spendings,
nX
i=1
iXi 
nX
i=1
Gi;
the world regulators budget constraint (8) shows that the sum of feasible transfers to
consumers is positive. All of them may be positive. If not, at least one consumer must
receive a negative transfer.
3.2 Decentralization: an international environmental agency, local
governments and consumers
The previous decomposition of the taxes on the polluting good suggests that the optimal
allocation may be obtained in a decentralized setting, where local governments impose
local taxes, aimed at correcting local externalities, while a global (carbon) tax is im-
plemented at the world level by an international environmental agency. We may then
assume that the environmental agency redistributes the receipts of the carbon tax to local
governments rather than to consumers.
Consumer budget constraints are still (7), with i = i +  . The consumer pays a
tax i to the local government and a tax  to the environmental agency. Let Ti be the
transfer from the environmental agency to local government i. The local governments
budget constraints are
Gi + Tci = iXi + Ti (12)
where Tci is now the transfer from governement i to its consumer, while the environmental
agencys budget constraint is
nX
i=1
Ti = 
nX
i=1
Xi (13)
Carbon tax receipts are redistributed to local governments. Each of them uses the
revenues, together with local tax receipts, to nance local public goods provision and
lump-sum transfers to its consumers. Nothing prevents transfers Ti and Tci from being
negative.
From (7) and (12) we obtain country budget constraints:
Ci +Gi + (1 + )Xi = Yi + Ti; i = 1; 2; :::; n (14)
They can be written as
Ti = Xi + (Ci +Gi +Xi   Yi) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n (15)
which shows that each transfer to a government includes the redistribution of the world
taxes levied on the country and an additional term taking care of the desired redistribution
between countries.
The conclusion of this exercise is that di¤erences in local energy taxes do not refute
the uniformity of the carbon tax, provided that local taxes are optimally designed to
counter local externalities. This result is natural in a rst best setting where lump-sum
transfers may be freely implemented between countries and consumers. The issue is to
see whether this result still holds in a second best setting.
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4 Second best
We follow the Ramsey optimal taxation approach and assume that it is not possible to
make negative transfers to consumers. The world regulator in the centralized setting, or
the local governments in the decentralized setting, are unable to levy lump-sum taxes
on consumers, and must instead resort to distortionary taxation, if needed. The new
constraint is simply that lump-sum transfers Tci have to be non-negative.
As was rst shown by Sandmo (1975) in a one-country framework, the presence of
externalities modies the optimal tax scheme. If Pigovian taxation receipts are su¢ cient
to nance public good provision and the desired redistribution is limited, the rst best
allocation is attainable. Tax receipts are able to nance public goods provision and some
positive lump-sum transfers to consumers. If not, additional distortionary taxation is
required and we switch to a second best situation.
In our framework, the non-negativity of transfers to consumers takes the following
form, which follows from (7):
Ci + (1 + i)Xi  Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n (16)
4.1 The second best optimum and its implementation
A world regulator is again in charge of all public decisions. Formally, the problem is to
maximize (2) under the resource constraint (3) and the additional incentive constraint
(Ci   Yi) +XiU
i
X (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw)
U iC (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw)
 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n (17)
This is a so-called primal version of constraint (16), where we use the consumers opti-
mality condition (9) to eliminate the tax rate.
Let us dene H i (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Xw) as the left-hand side of (17), and denote H iC the
partial derivative of H i with respect to Ci; the other expressions (H iG, H
i
X ; H
i
Z ; H
i
Zw
)
having a similar meaning. Let us also denote ei the Lagrange multiplier associated to
constraint (17), and i = ei=i: We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 A second best Pareto optimum is characterized by the following condi-
tions:
1(U
1
C + 1H
1
C) = ::: = n(U
n
C + nH
n
C) (18)
U iG + iH
i
G
U iC + iH
i
C
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (19)
U iX + iH
i
X
U iC + iH
i
C
+
U iZ + iH
i
Z
U iC + iH
i
C
+
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw
U jC + jH
j
C
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (20)
The conditions for a Pareto optimum of Proposition 1 must be adjusted to take into
account the impossibility to nance public goods through a lump-sum tax on consumers.
Variable i is the cost of levying public funds on individual i or, more precisely, the cost
of being unable to levy a lump-sum tax on the representative consumer in country i.
These funds may be used to nance public goods or simply to redistribute income. i
is equal to zero if the world regulator wishes instead to make a direct positive transfer
Tci to consumer i. It might be the case that the world regulator wishes to do so for all
8
consumers. This occurs if, on the one hand, tax receipts from strictly Pigovian taxes (the
rst best taxes) prove su¢ cient to nance all the desired public goods and, on the other
hand, the world regulator is satised with redistributing the excess as positive lump-sum
taxes to all consumers, as he/she does not want to alter too much the world distribution
of income. In such a case all is are zero and the second best optimality conditions reduce
to the rst best ones. This is a very special case however. A more plausible case is the
one where some, or all, is are positive. First best conditions must then be adjusted to
take into account the costs of levying public funds.
A special case is the one where the utility functions (1) are separable and quasi-linear
in Ci. Then U iC equals unity and the cross derivatives are nil, which implies H
i
C = 1;
H iG = H
i
Z = H
i
Zw
= 0 and H iX = U
i
X+XiU
i
XX . The rst two optimality conditions reduce
to
1(1 + 1) = ::: = n(1 + n) (21)
U iG = 1 + i (22)
Public goods provision must be pushed in each country to the level where the marginal
utility of public goods equals their production cost, here equal to one, augmented by the
cost i of levying public funds. Moreover, optimal international redistribution requires
the equality of the weighted overall costs of public goods i(1 + i):
The three sets of conditions (18)(20), together with the resource constraint (3) and
incentive constraints (17) determine the second best optimum. (19) and (20) are e¢ -
ciency conditions which do not depend on the social weights . Condition (18) selects a
particular optimum, depending on .
From these necessary conditions we can retrieve the second best optimal pollution
tax i and obtain, thanks to the additive structure of formula (20), a meaningful decom-
position of this tax rate. It follows from (9) that U iX = (1 + i)U
i
C : Then we have the
following:
Corollary 3 In a second best setting, the carbon tax is unique. The overall tax on the
polluting good may be decomposed in the sum of two local taxes and one global tax:
i = i +  i + 
with
i =  
U iZ + iH
i
Z
U iC + iH
i
C
;  i = i
U iX
U iC
H iC  H iX
U iC + iH
i
C
;  =  
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw
U jC + jH
j
C
Tax i is a Pigovian tax on local pollution. Tax  i is a Ramsey tax acting as a
substitute to the impossibility of levying lump-sum taxes on consumers. Finally, tax  is
a world carbon tax needed to curb greenhouse gas emissions. If the optimal second best
allocation is such that the incentive constraint (17) is not binding in country i; the cost
of levying public funds i is equal to zero, the Pigovian tax i has the same expression
as at the rst best (see (11)), and the Ramsey tax  i is equal to zero.
The striking result here is that the carbon tax  is uniform: it is the same for all
countries involved. This result, natural in a rst best setting, is more surprising in a
second best framework, where optimal rules are usually quite di¤erent from what they
would be at the rst best. The virtues of a uniform carbon tax and its ability to provide
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proper incentives are much less compelling when specic constraints preexist and un-
avoidably introduce many distortions in the economy. Di¤erentiated carbon prices might
then appear as a useful compromise between e¢ ciency and equity. Sandmo (2005) asks
exactly the same question as we do: "Should one design compensatory transfers [between
rich and poor countries], or should the design of the environmental taxes themselves have
built-in distributional elements?" (pp. 121)1. Our result is that the design of the carbon
tax must not include distributional elements. Those are taken care of by the lump-sum
international transfers implicitly present in our setting, through the assumption that the
resource constraint (3) is global2, and through the local Ramsey taxes  i.
To be still more precise about the meaning of our result, let us consider the case where
there are neither public spending nor local externalities. We now have a model stripped
of any local element, and the issue of the uniformity of the carbon tax is posed in a
perfectly clear way. The Pigovian tax i is obviously nil, as there is no local externality.
It is easy to see that the Ramsey tax  i is not, and has the same formal expression as in
the general case. Now, its only objective is to take care of equity issues, and it is di¤erent
for the consumers belonging to di¤erent countries. The tax rate  aimed at ghting the
global externality also has the same formal expression as in the general case. The overall
tax on the polluting good i =  i+  is di¤erentiated among countries, but the Pigovian
part  is common (see Table 2, but ignore the Third best entry for the time being). The
world regulator perceives the optimality of having a uniform carbon tax  ; but he/she
also wants to nance in an equitable way the distribution of lump-sum transfers to the
poorest consumers. This is done by imposing di¤erent  i components in the overall tax.
Table 2: No local externalities and public goods
First best
1U
1
C= ::: = nU
n
C  =   =  
Pn
j=1
UjZw
UjC
Second best
1(U
1
C+1H
1
C) = ::: = n(U
n
C+nH
n
C) i =  i +   i= i
UiX
Ui
C
HiC HiX
U iC+iH
i
C
 =  Pnj=1 UjZw+jHjZwUjC+jHjC
Third best
1(U
1
C U1X) = ::: = n(UnC UnX) i =  i  i=  
Pn
j=1 jU
j
Zw
iU
i
C
We may compare these results with the ones obtained by Sandmo (1975). We keep
local elements out but replace them by a unique global public good, as in Sandmo (1975)
and assume, as he does, that the desired quantity of this global public good is given.
No change has to be made in our formulas, apart from the fact that the amount of
global public good appears in the resource constraint. Sandmo considers heterogeneous
consumers in a one-country framework. He of course assumes that the tax rate  on
the polluting good has to be unique. In our multi-country framework, we show that
the world regulator should indeed use the possibility of di¤erentiating this tax among
di¤erent countries.
1The framework Sandmo (2005) uses is a two-country model of a structure close to ours but without
local externalities and local public goods. He studies the rst best solution of the model, but not the
second best, in the sense we have given to this term (no negative transfers to consumers).
2For country i; these transfers are simply Ci +Gi +Xi   Yi.
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4.2 Decentralization: the subsidiarity principle
The previous results may be claried if we introduce a two-level regulation. An interna-
tional environmental agency sets the world carbon tax3, and distributes transfers to local
governments. Each of these is then free to deal as it wishes with local externalities and
distortionary taxation needed to nance the provision of local public goods.
The budget constraint (12) of local government i which was relevant in the case of the
rst best, must be adapted to take into account the local Ramsey taxes  i. Government
is budget constraint now is:
Gi + Tci = (i +  i)Xi + Ti; Tci  0 (23)
The environmental agency collects the carbon tax imposed on consumers in each
country and redistributes the receipts as lump-sum transfers Ti to local governments.
The sum of these transfers is positive but some of them may be negative.
A close examination of the determination of a second best Pareto optimum suggests
a two stage solution method. Let us rewrite the problem:
max
C;X;G;Zw
nX
i=1
iU
i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)
under constraints
(Ci   Yi) +XiU
i
X (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)
U iC (Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw)
 0; i = 1; :::; n (24)
nX
i=1
Xi = Zw (25)
nX
i=1
(Ci +Xi +Gi) 
nX
i=1
Yi (26)
This problem is equivalent to a problem where we introduce new variables  and Ti,
i = 1; :::; n and impose constraints
Ci +Gi + (1 + )Xi = Yi + Ti; i = 1; 2; :::; n (27)
nX
i=1
Ti  Zw (28)
instead of constraint (26). Indeed, taking into account (25), constraints (27) and (28)
imply (26). Conversely, for any arbitrary  , consider a triplet (C;X;G) satisfying (26).
Dene Ti = Ci + Gi + (1 + )Xi   Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Summing implies
P
Ti   Zw =P
(Ci +Gi +Xi   Yi) ; which is negative as (C;X;G) satises (26). Thus (28) is satised.
Let us now consider the maximization of social welfare under constraints (24), (25),
(27) and (28). We may solve this problem in two stages.
First, the international environmental agency chooses  and T = (T1; :::; Tn) and, given
those  and T , local governments look for Ci, Gi, Xi which maximize their representative
consumers utility U i(Ci; Xi; Gi; Xi; Zw) under constraints (24) and (27), and on the basis
of their expectation of Zw: This yields demand functions
Ci = 
i( ; Ti; Zw); Xi = 
i( ; Ti; Zw); Gi = 
i( ; Ti; Zw)
3It can alternatively control carbon emissions through a permits market.
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and the indirect utility function
W i ( ; Ti; Zw)
For given  and T; a perfect foresight equilibrium on Zw occurs, such that condition (25)
is satised.
Second, the international environmental agency chooses the optimal  and T . It solves
the following problem:
max
;T;Zw
nX
i=1
iW
i ( ; Ti; Zw)
under constraints (26) and (28), (26) being now written as
nX
i=1
i( ; Ti; Zw) = Zw
The international environmental agency controls carbon emissions through a carbon
tax. It distributes the revenues of the carbon tax as lump-sum transfers to local govern-
ments. These transfers may be negative in order to further subsidize some countries. A
common carbon price is thus imposed at the world level. Each local government is still
unable to nance its public goods provision through lump-sum taxation. But it is left
free to choose its own way to levy funds and regulate local externalities. A subsidiarity
principle is thus in e¤ect.
Local governments are passive in the sense that they take as given the carbon tax
 as well as transfers Tis. Their problem is to maximize the utility of their representa-
tive consumer under their country budget constraint (14) and their incentive constraint
(17). We do not make explicit the precise way they will implement this solution. The
international environmental agency only takes into account the indirect utility function
W i ( ; Ti; Zw) of each country and the demand of the polluting good 
i( ; Ti; Zw).
Proposition 4 A second best optimum may be implemented by an international envi-
ronmental agency imposing a unique carbon tax and implementing intercountry lump-sum
transfers.
This result shows how e¤ective a uniform carbon price remains in a framework where
each country faces second best constraints. Carbon taxation and intercountry transfers
are the sole international coordination required to reach a social optimum. We also note
that the proof does not depend on the form of the incentive constraints and is therefore
quite general.
This proof provides a deeper explanation of the uniformity of the carbon tax. It
shows that this uniformity property is in fact the consequence of a subsidiarity principle.
The international environmental agency does not have to take into account the precise
way in which each country regulates local externalities and nances the provision of
its public goods. It may trust that this is achieved e¢ ciently and only cares about the
global climatic externality and the proper distribution of transfers. In some sense, the
international regulation of the climatic externality remains a rst best problem.
5 A third best
We now assume, as in Shiell (2003) and Sandmo (2005), that for political economy reasons,
local governments are not ready to accept a smaller transfer than the amount of carbon
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taxes their citizens are paying to the environmental agency. Each local government
actually receives a positive transfer from the environmental agency, as the country level
of emissions is always positive, but there are no other intercountry transfers. Each country
then has to satisfy constraint
Ci +Xi +Gi = Yi; i = 1; 2; :::; n (29)
The problem is to maximize (2) under the resource constraints (29) and the additional
incentive constraints (17). We name the second best optimum taking into account this
additional constraint third best.
Proposition 5 A third best Pareto optimum is characterized by the following conditions:
i
 
U iX + iH
i
X

+
 
U iZ + iH
i
Z
   U iC + iH iC	 =  X j  U jZw + jHjZw ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n
(30)
U iG + iH
i
G
U iC + iH
i
C
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (31)
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw 
U jC + jH
j
C
   U jX + jHjX   U jZ + jHjZ = 1 (32)
The three sets of conditions (30)(32), together with the resource constraints (3) and
incentive constraints (17) determine the third best optimum. Condition (31) governing
the provision of public goods is the same as the one which appears in the second best
optimum (condition (19)). Condition (32) is implied by the set of similar conditions (20)
appearing in the second best solution. Indeed, (20) may be written as:
(U iX + iH
i
X) + (U
i
Z + iH
i
Z)  (U iC + iH iC)
U iC + iH
i
C
=  
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw
U jC + jH
j
C
; i = 1; 2; ::::; n
Dividing through by the common value of the LHS yields (32).
Consider now a particular allocation in the set of second best optima, where all
transfers happen to be zero. Such an equilibrium usually exists and is unique. By denition
it satises constraints (29) and therefore all constraints entering the denition of a third
best optimum. We just showed that it satises all the optimality conditions for such an
optimum. We thus conrm the rather natural property that, in general, one of the third
best optima is a particular second best optimum. Both hypersurfaces in the space of
utility levels will be tangent. This property has been stressed by Shiell (2003). Other
third best optimum allocations are not second best optimum allocations. As we now
show, this means that di¤erentiated carbon taxes will be necessary to support them.
Corollary 6 In a third best setting, the carbon tax is generally not unique. The overall
tax on the polluting good can be decomposed into three country-specic taxes:
i = i +  i +  i
with
i =  
U iZ + iH
i
Z
U iC + iH
i
C
;  i = i
U iX
U iC
H iC  H iX
U iC + iH
i
C
;  i =  
P
j
 
U jZw + jH
j
Zw

i (U
i
C + iH
i
C)
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The expressions of the Pigovian and the Ramsey tax rates i and  i are the same as
in the second best case. The carbon tax  i is now also country-specic. More precisely,
we have
1(U
1
C + 1H
1
C) 1 = ::: = n(U
n
C + nH
n
C)n (33)
Carbon prices are not equalized worldwide. Only weighted carbon prices are, the weight
of country i being i(U
i
C + iH
i
C). This generalizes the similar relation which underlines
the results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1994). As we take into account the provision of
public goods, a new element iH
i
C appears, which takes into account the cost of levying
public funds in the country.
We may then restate the core of the Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) argument. In
the case where intercountry transfers are feasible, condition (18) in Proposition 2 states
that country weights are equalized. It follows that carbon prices, and abatement costs in
the Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) set-up, are equalized. In the absence of intercountry
transfers, the weights are not equalized and neither are the optimal carbon prices.
We may assume that social weights  reect the world regulators aversion to inequal-
ity, which would automatically follow if we deduced them from the maximization of a
symmetric international social utility function. A poorer country is then characterized by
a higher i. This leads to reduction of inequality, but probably not its disappearance. A
poorer country presumably remains poorer in the double sense that it has both a lower
level of consumption, and therefore a higher marginal utility U iC of consumption, and a
higher cost of levying public funds, and therefore a higher iH
i
C coe¢ cient. We may thus
safely assume that a poorer country is characterized by a larger weight i(U
i
C + iH
i
C).
The carbon price  i must then be lower in a poorer country. A smaller environmental ef-
fort must be required from poor countries, which is simply another part of the worldwide
social optimization.
In order to compare our results with those obtained by Chichilnisky and Heal (1994),
Shiell (2003) and Sandmo (2005), let us consider again our model in the absence of local
externalities and public goods. We have Gi = 0 and constraint (29) becomes Ci+Xi = Yi.
Comparison with the budget constraint (27) implies Tci = iXi, which is positive. The
incentive constraint is not binding so that i = 0 for all i, which implies  i = 0: The
formulas in Proposition 5 are much simpler and become similar to the ones obtained by
these authors. They have a rst best avor (see Table 2), whereas our analysis starts
from a clear second best setting and is therefore more general.
6 Conclusion
It has been shown that the presence of public goods, restrictions on the redistributions of
local tax revenues to local consumers, and the addition of a local component to the damage
caused by global emissions does in principle not aggravate the problem of addressing the
design of a second best optimal global pollution tax. An appropriate decomposition of the
pollution tax can deal with the local aspect of pollution and with the constraint that only
non-negative transfers can be given to local consumers. Hence, the global externality can
be dealt with at the global level, through a uniform tax or a system of tradable permits.
Nevertheless it is required that at the government levels international transfers can still
be implemented. And it cannot be hoped that this problem can be solved. Indeed, it
is uncertain whether governments will accept negative lump-sum transfers and even to
receive less than what the country pays as carbon taxes. Chichilnisky and Heal (1994)
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have stressed that the impossibility of international redistribution should lead to reject the
principle of equalizing worldwide abatement costs, that is having a uniform world carbon
price. If we introduce constraints on intercountry transfers into our model, a uniform
carbon price would not allow to reach the desired second best optimum. International
di¤erentiation of the price of carbon sometimes provides a useful instrument to reach
a more equitable allocation. However, when it comes to climate change international
transfers (whether monetary or technological or in terms of allocating permits) are in
the picture already. The international community is aware of the fact that in reaching
international agreements side payments are unavoidable.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
Let  be the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. Necessary condi-
tions are:
iU
i
C = ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (34)
iU
i
G = ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (35)
i
 
U iX + U
i
Z

+
nX
j=1
jU
j
Zw
= ; i = 1; 2; ::::; n (36)
Conditions (34) and (35) yield condition (5) in Proposition 1.
Dividing both sides of (36) by , and noting from (34) that  may be taken equal to
iU
i
C or to any of the jU
j
C yields
U iX
U iC
+
U iZ
U iC
+
nX
j=1
U jZw
U jC
= 1; i = 1; 2; ::::; n
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which is condition (6) in Proposition 1.
B Proof of Proposition 2 and Corollary 3
Let  and ei = ii be the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (3) and (17).
i will be interpreted as the cost of levying public funds in country i.
Assuming an interior solution (Ci; Xi; Gi; Zi; Zw) > 0, we can write the optimality
conditions as follows:
i
 
U iC + iH
i
C

=  (37)
i
 
U iG + iH
i
G

=  (38)
i
 
U iX + iH
i
X

+ i
 
U iZ + iH
i
Z

+
nX
j=1
j
 
U jZw + jH
j
Zw

=  (39)
(37) and (38) yield condition (19) in Proposition 2.
Dividing (39) by  and choosing from (37), in each place, the appropriate expression
for  leads to (20) in Proposition 2. This equation may be written as
U iX
U iC
  1 = i
U iX
U iC
H iC  H iX
U iC + iH
i
C
  U
i
Z + iH
i
Z
U iC + iH
i
C
 
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw
U jC + jH
j
C
which is Corollary 3.
C Proof of Proposition 5 and Corollary 6
Let i and ei = ii be the Lagrange multipliers associated to constraints (29) and (17).
Optimality conditions are, for i = 1; 2; ::::; n,
i
 
U iC + iH
i
C

= i (40)
i
 
U iG + iH
i
G

= i (41)
i
 
U iX + iH
i
X

+
 
U iZ + iH
i
Z
	
= i  
nX
j=1
j
 
U jZw + jH
j
Z

(42)
(40) and (41) imply (31) in Proposition 5.
From (40) and (42) we have
i
 
U iX + iH
i
X

+
 
U iZ + iH
i
Z
   U iC + iH iC	 =   nX
j=1
j
 
U jZw + jH
j
Z

; i = 1; 2; ::::; n
(43)
The RHS does not depend on i so that LHS expressions are equal accross i. Dividing
through by this common value, and in particular dividing each term of the sum by the
j-indexed expression of the LHS yields
1 =
nX
j=1
U jZw + jH
j
Zw 
U jC + jH
j
C
   U jX + jHjX   U jZ + jHjZ
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which is (32) in Proposition 5.
Condition (43) may be written as:
U iX
U iC
  1 = i
U iX
U iC
H iC  H iX
U iC + iH
i
C
  U
i
Z + iH
i
Z
U iC + iH
i
C
 
P
j
 
U jZw + jH
j
Z

i (U
i
C + iH
i
C)
which is Corollary 6.
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